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Former National Security Advisor under President George W. Bush 
It is a pleasure to be with you today to 
honor the legacy of Brent Scowcroft.  I want to 
begin by paying my respects to President George 
H.W. Bush and Mrs. Bush.  It is great to see you 
looking so well and we all appreciate so much 
your being with us for this important program.  
Many of us had the honor and the privilege of 
serving in your administration, and we consider 
ourselves fortunate indeed to have served a 
President as noble, principled, and extraordinary 
as George Herbert Walker Bush. 
It is impossible to talk about the role of 
the National Security Advisor without talking 
about Brent Scowcroft.  It is fair to say that Henry 
Kissinger was the father of the “ interagency 
system” that is still with us today.  Dr. Kissinger 
established the network of committees at various 
levels within the Executive Branch that bring 
together representatives of the relevant 
departments and agencies to address national 
security and foreign policy issues.  But General 
Scowcroft is the father of the modern-day 
National Security Advisor. 
 Interestingly, the National Security Act 
of 1947, which established the National Security 
Council, makes no mention of the National 
Security Advisor.  The position began to emerge 
under President Kennedy, when occupied by 
McGeorge Bundy.  Certainly the position 
acquired its greatest public prominence when 
Henry Kissinger became National Security 
Advisor under President Nixon, and again with 
Zbigniew Brzezinski in the position under 
President Carter. 
However, the manner and method by 
which Brent Scowcroft performed the role 
became the model or “base case” for all those 
who came after him.  David Rothkopf, with his 
authoritative studies of the role of the National 
Security Advisor and the various individuals who 
have filled that position, concludes that the 
“Scowcroft Model” is the one that best serves the 
President and our nation’s national security 
decision-making process. 
Brent not only defined the role, he was 
also instrumental in preserving the position in its 
current form when it came under attack in the 
“arms for hostages” crisis during the 
administration of President Reagan. The terrorist 
group Hezbollah had taken several Americans 
hostage and held them in Lebanon.  Contrary to 
its established policy of not ransoming hostages, 
the Reagan administration sold weapons to Iran 
in hopes that Iran would use its influence with 
Hezbollah to obtain the freedom of the hostages.  
In violation of Congressional direction and law, 
the administration diverted the proceeds of the 
arms sales to the Contras – rebel forces resisting 
the Communist take-over in Nicaragua.  It 
seemed that everything in the National Security 
Council system had gone wrong, that the process 
was completely broken. 
The resulting public outcry led to calls 
for Congress to exert more control over the 
National Security Council system by, among 
other things, amending the National Security Act 
of 1947 to require Senate confirmation of the 
National Security Advisor and public testimony 
from the National Security Advisor before 
Congress.  Such a step would have virtually 
destroyed the utility of the position to the 
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President.  The position is one of trust and 
confidence.  If a President thought that what he or 
she shared with the National Security Advisor 
could be compelled in public testimony, the 
President would look elsewhere for a national 
security and foreign policy confidante.  Indeed, it 
would raise a Constitutional  issue of separation 
of powers.   Without a National Security Advisor 
and a National Security Council staff reporting 
only to the President, it is difficult to see how the 
President could perform the duties and fulfill the 
responsibilities given to the President by the 
Constitution in the area of national security and 
foreign policy.  
In the wake of the public outcry, 
President Reagan established an independent 
review panel chaired by former Senator John 
Tower that also included former Senator Edmund 
Muskie and Brent Scowcroft, who by then had 
been National Security Advisor under President 
Ford.  Their task was to review what had gone 
wrong in the so-called Iran-Contra affair and 
make recommendations to President Reagan as to 
how he should reform the National Security 
Council system. 
Brent was the driving force in using the 
“Tower Commission” report to defend the system 
as an instrument of Presidential prerogative and 
responsibility beyond the reach of Congress.  The 
report vigorously defended the role of the 
National Security Advisor and its independence 
from direct Congressional oversight. 
The Commission report helped win the 
argument, and Congress backed off.  Brent 
personally wrote the section of the report 
describing the proper role of the National 
Security Advisor.  I know because I served as 
Counsel to the Commission and was the initial 
drafter of the body of the report and its 
recommendations.  Brent put me through more 
than 20 drafts of this section of the report until we 
had it to his liking.  Admittedly I am biased, but I 
think it is still the best description of the proper 
role of the National Security Advisor within the 
National Security Council system and how the 
National Security Advisor should perform his or 
her responsibilities in support of the President. 
That is why it is impossible to talk about 
the role of the National Security Advisor without 
talking about Brent Scowcroft.  He first served in 
the role under President Ford from 1975 to 1977, 
helped preserve the position in its current 
conception during his service on the Tower 
Commission from 1986 to 1987, wrote the 
definitive description of the role in the Tower 
Commission Report of February 26, 1987, served 
in the position a second time under President 
George H. W. Bush from 1989 to 1993, and 
became the role model for all of us that followed 
him in that position. 
Serving as the National Security Advisor 
is the best foreign policy job in government.  You 
get to spend more time with the President than 
any other member of the President’s national 
security team.  You are the first to see the 
President in the morning when the President 
shows up for work in the Oval Office and the last 
person to see the President before he or she makes 
any major foreign policy or national security 
decision.  You are the person most likely to know 
the President’s mind on these issues.  You are 
involved in consequential matters that span the 
globe and affect the world.   If you like policy 
over pomp, you will love this job.  You spend a 
higher proportion of your time on policy 
substance than any other national security 
principal – being freed of the ceremonial duties 
that often serve to encumber your cabinet 
secretary colleagues.  You run the interagency 
process that analyzes issues, develops options, 
and then presents them to the President.  And then 
you oversee the process by which the President’s 
decisions are implemented by the various 
       If a President thought that what he or she shared with the National Security Advisor 
could be compelled in public testimony, the President would look elsewhere for a national 
security and foreign policy confidante. 
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departments and agencies of the federal 
government. 
 
 But that all being said, the National 
Security Advisor is a staff job  You help the 
President play the leading role that the U.S. 
Constitution gives to the President in national 
security and foreign policy.  It is because it is a 
staff role that it is exempted from Senate 
confirmation or public Congressional testimony.  
This fact puts a special burden on the National 
Security Advisor to be self-limiting as to power 
and position.  The National Security Advisor 
must be careful not to usurp the role of the cabinet 
officers – especially the Secretaries of Defense 
and State -- to which the Senate has given its 
confirmation and to which the Congress has 
appropriated the funds and the personnel slots to 
conduct the national security and foreign policy 
business of the country under Congressional 
oversight.  If the National Security Advisor seeks 
to assume these functions – even if encouraged to 
do so by the President – then the Congress can 
rightly cry “foul” and seek to renegotiate the 
current arrangement that makes the National 
Security Advisor such a unique instrument for the 
President.   Such an outcome would put the very 
position at risk, as we saw during the Iran-Contra 
affair, and are seeing again on Capitol Hill. 
 
 There are times when a national security 
cabinet officer or agency head is not adequately 
performing their responsibilities.  But the 
solution in such a case is not for the National 
Security Advisor to try to substitute for the 
cabinet officer or agency head – or for the 
National Security Council staff to try to substitute 
itself for the responsible agency or departmental 
staff and draw more responsibility and control 
into the White House.  That is a recipe for failure 
– for no matter how talented, the National 
Security Council staff cannot possibly have the 
necessary expertise or bandwidth to do the job 
that needs to be done.  The solution in such a case 
is for the cabinet officer or agency head either to 
raise their game or be replaced by the President.  
You cannot successfully substitute staff for line.  
If the line organization is not working, then the 
line organization needs to be fixed. 
 
 The province of the National Security 
Advisor and the National Security Council staff 
should be the following: 
 
1.  Staffing and supporting the President in 
playing the President’s constitutional role in 
national security and foreign policy.   
 
 This encompasses a wide range of 
activities that include helping plan the President’s 
foreign travel, providing background memos and 
staffing for the President’s meetings and phone 
calls with world leaders, preparing the President 
for the meetings of the National Security Council, 
helping to draft national security and foreign 
policy speeches, helping to prepare for meetings 
with Congressional leaders, responding to 
Presidential requests for all kinds of information 
and analysis, and briefing the President on the 
issues of the moment. 
 
2.  Advocating and advancing Presidential 
initiatives within Executive Branch.   
 
 This does not mean running operations 
out of the White House.  It does mean overseeing 
the implementation and execution of Presidential 
initiatives by the relevant departments and 
agencies of the Executive Branch.  If a 
department or agency is not doing what it should 
be doing to implement and execute a Presidential 
initiative, it means alerting the cabinet secretary 
or agency head in the first instance, and the 
President if necessary.  If the National Security 
Advisor and the National Security Council staff 
are not championing Presidential initiatives 
within the government, no one else will. 
The Role and Importance of the National Security Advisor 
4 
3. Injecting a sense of urgency into the
interagency process.
Getting things done “in the ordinary 
course of business” too often means that nothing 
is going to get done at all.  Particularly when 
dealing with a crisis, this is simply not good 
enough.  The role of the National Security 
Advisor and the National Security Council staff 
is to allocate responsibilities among department 
and agencies with respect to a specific matter, set 
reasonable but urgent deadlines, and hold people 
accountable for meeting them. 
4. Coordinating those important or
consequential initiatives and policies that
require the concerted effort of multiple
departments and agencies to achieve a
Presidential objective.
Such interagency coordination was one 
of the specific purposes enumerated for the 
National Security Council in the National 
Security Act of 1947.  It is the principal reason 
for the system of interagency committees at 
multiple levels of government that constitute the 
“interagency system.”  Integrating across the 
various departments and agencies of the 
Executive Branch – the “stovepipes” of the 
interagency system – and setting priorities are 
central to the mission of the National Security 
Advisor and the National Security Council staff.  
This is why the National Security Council staff 
needs to be small.  If the goal is integration – 
seeing relationships across diverse problem sets -
- and setting priorities – among the myriad of 
issues that come to the President, then it is better 
to have more information in fewer heads.  The job 
of the National Security Council staff is to get the 
government to work as much as possible like a 
single enterprise in pursuit of common goals.  As 
we used to say in my day, when the process 
succeeds, it is the President’s success; when the 
process fails, it is the failure of the National 
Security Advisor and the National Security 
Council staff.   
5. Injecting a sense of strategy into the
interagency process.
Robert Blackwill, a wonderful colleague 
of Condi Rice and mine during the George W. 
Bush administration and a former U.S. 
Ambassador to India, used to say that the first 
thing that gets lost in any interagency meeting of 
more that two people is any sense of “what they 
are trying to do?”  All too often in interagency 
meetings, this is the question that finally gets 
asked 50 minutes into the meeting with only 10 
minutes left.  The jobs of the National Security 
Advisor and the National Security Council staff 
are to make sure that this question gets asked at 
the start of the meeting, and not at the end.  That 
is where strategy starts:  “What are we trying to 
achieve?”  And the next question is:  “How are 
we going to achieve it?” 
Former Secretary of State George Shultz 
tells a wonderful story in his book “Issues On My 
Mind.”  He writes that a few times a week while 
he was Secretary he would tell his outer office 
staff that he was going to go into his office, shut 
the door, and was not to be disturbed for the next 
hour or so unless his wife or the President called 
in that order (thereby showing that domestic 
relations trump foreign relations even for the 
Secretary of State – at least a wise Secretary of 
State!).  Secretary Shultz said that in the solitude 
of his office, he would then take paper and pencil 
and begin to address the issue of the moment, first 
writing down a clear statement of where did we 
want to go and then how could we get there.  The 
National Security Advisor (and the National 
Security Council staff) need to do the same thing.  
It is hard, given the press of events and the 
pressures of the moment, but if you do not know 
where you are going then almost any road will get 
you there.  And that is not a prescription for a 
Serving as the National Security Advisor is the best foreign policy job in government.  You get 
to spend more time with the President than any other member of the President’s national 
security team. 
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successful national security and foreign policy 
agenda. 
 
6.  Explaining the President’s policies to the 
public.   
 
 The National Security Advisor needs to 
be careful here not to usurp the role of the 
Secretary of State as the principal foreign policy 
spokesperson for the administration (or the 
Secretary of Defense as the principal defense 
policy spokesperson).  But the National Security 
Advisor is uniquely positioned to elaborate for 
the public the mind of the President and the 
President’s perspective – how the President sees 
an issue, what the President is trying to achieve, 
and how the President is trying to achieve it.  
When playing this public role, what matters is not 
what the National Security Advisor thinks but 
what the President thinks – and the National 
Security Advisor needs to speak in the 
President’s name, and not in his or her own name.   
Approached in this way, it is a role that the 
National Security Advisor’s National Security 
Council colleagues will understand and respect. 
 
 If the foregoing six points summarize the 
“job description” of the National Security 
Advisor, then what is the “Scowcroft Model” for 
how the job should be carried out?  It has five 
basic elements. 
 
1.  Be an “Honest Broker.”   
 
 Being an “honest broker” means running 
a fair and transparent process for bringing issues 
to the President for decision.  It means 
maintaining a “level playing field” in which ideas 
and views can compete with one another on an 
equal basis, without “stacking the deck” in favor 
of one or another approach.  It means in particular 
not using the privileged position accorded to the 
National Security Advisor in this process to “tilt” 
the process in favor of the outcome favored by the 
National Security Advisor.  As National Security 
Advisor you must resist the temptation to put 
your “thumb on the scales” during the decision 
process, for this will bias what goes to the 
President and could potentially narrow the 
President’s options.  In addition, being an 
“Honest Broker” means: 
 
 a.  Make the national security principals 
full participants in the policy process.   
 
 The national security and foreign policy 
cabinet secretaries and agency heads are the 
people who run the departments and agencies of 
the Executive Branch that will implement and 
execute any policy initiative or decision taken by 
the President.  So it is important that they not only 
“buy in” to the President’s initiative or decision 
but do so with conviction and enthusiasm.  The 
best way to achieve this result is for them to be 
full participants from the beginning in the process 
by which the intiative or decision is developed.  It 
is the National Security Advisor’s job to make 
sure this happens. 
 
  In many White House operations 
that I have observed – particularly on the 
domestic policy side of the operation – there is a 
tendency for the White House staff to develop 
initiatives or issues, take them on a “tentative 
basis” to the President to “take his temperature” 
on the matter, and then – and only then -- to bring 
in the relevant cabinet secretaries and agency 
heads.  This means that the initiative or decision 
has largely already been made by the President 
before their input, which makes for a less rich and 
productive policy development process for the 
President and for a less satisfying and motivating 
experience for the cabinet secretaries and agency 
heads.  The better practice is to include these 
officials from the beginning in the development 
of an initiative or issue – so that it has the benefit 
of their wisdom and perspective – and then to 
include them when the initiative or issue is 
presented to the President. 
 
 b.   Don’t insert yourself between the 
President and the principal cabinet secretaries 
and agency heads.   
 
 Being an “Honest Broker” does not just 
mean presenting the views of cabinet secretaries 
and agency heads to the President in a fair and 
balanced way.   These officials should be the 
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President’s closest advisors on national security 
and foreign policy matters, and the President 
should hear from them directly and in person.  It 
is the job of the National Security Advisor to 
encourage and facilitate direct interaction 
between them and the President.  This can occur 
in formal National Security Council meetings, in 
informal group meetings in the Oval Office or in 
the White House residence, in periodic one-on-
one meetings between a cabinet secretary and the 
President (usually with the Vice President, White 
House Chief of Staff, and the National Security 
Advisor attending), and over the telephone. 
Don’t let the President take the easy way out -- 
and make you as National Security Advisor the 
President’s conduit to the President’s cabinet 
officers.  It may contribute to your sense of self-
importance as National Security Advisor, but it 
will not contribute to strengthening the ties 
between the President and the President’s 
principal national security and foreign policy 
advisors.   And that is what you should really 
want -- if you are doing the job the President 
needs you to do as National Security Advisor. 
It was a very common practice at 
least for President George W. Bush to conclude a 
National Security Council meeting on a particular 
issue by saying that he would sleep on the matter 
and let everyone know his decision in the 
morning.  Come the next morning, the President 
would arrive in the Oval Office, announce his 
decision, and tell me to “let the team know.”   
Especially when the issue was relevant to a 
particular cabinet secretary, I would urge the 
President to call the cabinet secretary and inform 
the cabinet secretary directly.  This is particularly 
important when the issue involves the use of 
military force.  The National Security Advisor is 
not in the military chain of command, which runs 
directly from the President to the Secretary of 
Defense.  Instructions on military matters need to 
be given in that chain of command – and the 
National Security Advisor should not seek – or 
permit himself or herself -- to be inserted into that 
chain of command. 
c. Don’t undermine your national
security colleagues with the President or 
advance yourself with the President at their 
expense.   
We all want to “please the teacher” – and 
everyone in the White House wants to please the 
President.  It is not a bad thing to want the 
President’s confidence and approval.  But that 
impulse can sometimes lead to destructive 
competition and “beggar thy neighbor” behavior 
among those who serve the President.  As 
National Security Advisor, it is a particular 
temptation.  You are with the President so much 
– and a source of so much of the information that
the President receives – that you can almost
unconsciously begin to shade your reporting to
the President so that you look good at the expense
of others.  Don’t do it.  Your job is to help cabinet
officers and agency heads to succeed in their jobs
– the President needs them to succeed, and so
does the country.  And their prospects for success
are enhanced if they have the confidence and
support of the President.  It is your job to promote
that Presidential confidence and facilitate that
Presidential support.
Let me give you an example of 
the kind of temptation that you need to resist.  So 
you are National Security Advisor.  You get up at 
4:30 AM so that you can be at your desk in the 
West Wing of the White House by 5:30 AM, 
reading the overnight intelligence and looking at 
the day’s newspaper headlines.  And there it is – 
on the front page of the Washington Post, above 
the fold, a news leak clearly coming out of the 
State Department that you know is going to annoy 
mightily the President of the United States.  At 
that point you have two choices: 
Choice 1:  
You can go in to the Oval Office at 7:05 
AM, draw the President’s attention to the leak, 
and then say:  “I know Mr. President.  I told the 
Secretary of State (in my case Condoleezza Rice) 
that she needs to get control of her building and 
stop these kinds of leaks.  But don’t worry, Mr. 
President.  I’ll speak to Condi and tell her this 
stuff has to stop.”  Result:  You look good, the 
Secretary of State looks bad -- and you have 
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violated the “Honest Broker” maxim of the 
“Scowcroft Model” and badly served the 
President of the United States in the process.  
 
 Choice 2 (the one I recommend):   
 
 You can call the Secretary of State at 
5:45 AM (again, in my case that was Condi Rice, 
and you know that Condi is already up and 
running on the treadmill because that is what she 
does), ask if she has seen the Washington Post 
leak (she may not have seen it yet), and ask her to 
take a look at the leak and call you back.  She calls 
back, provides some background on how the leak 
might have happened, and then says what she is 
going to do about it.  She then is likely to ask:  
“Should I tell the President or do you want to do 
it?”  Your response should be:  “You should call 
the President as soon as he comes into the Oval 
Office.  He needs to hear this from you.”  Then, 
you delay your entry into the Oval Office until 
7:15 AM.  The President will (hopefully) already 
be on the phone talking to the Secretary of State 
about the leak.  And when, after the call, he looks 
up and says “it was Condi calling about the leak,” 
you do not say “I know, I told her to call you.”  
Result:  You have encouraged direct contact 
between the President and the Secretary of State, 
you have enhanced the President’s confidence in 
the Secretary – and you have been true to the 
“Honest Broker” maxim of the  “Scowcroft 
Model” and have well served the President of the 
United States. 
 
 d.  Maintain the confidence of the other 
National Security Council principals.   
 
 Your national security colleagues will be 
watching to see if you are truly serving as an 
“Honest Broker” or whether you are trying to 
“game the system” in favor of your personal 
policy preferences.  To encourage their 
confidence, when I was National Security 
Advisor I would routinely share with them what I 
knew about the President’s thinking on any 
particular matter.  Indeed, the National Security 
Council principals will look to you as National 
Security Advisor to play this role given that day 
in and day out you are likely to be spending more 
time with the President than they are.  But I would 
try to go further and let my national security 
colleagues know what I was thinking about an 
issue before I gave any advice to the President.  
While I would keep confidential the precise 
advice I would ultimately give to the President, I 
would want my national security colleagues to 
know how I was leaning on an issue so that they 
could take that into account in their own advice 
to the President and have a chance to rebut my 
views to the President in the event that they 
disagreed with me.  To maintain the confidence 
of your colleagues, the watchword is “no tricks, 
no surprises.” 
 
2.  Put the President at the center of the 
decisionmaking process.   
 
 This is the second key element of the 
Scowcroft Model.  The interagency review that 
resulted in President George W. Bush’s January 
2007 decision to change strategy and “surge” 
more forces into Iraq is regarded by many as a 
model of good national security decisionmaking.  
One of the reasons for this is that the review was 
structured to put the President at the center of the 
process.  President Bush personally directed that 
the review be undertaken, he participated in it 
actively and personally, and the review was 
structured to bring to the President a full array of 
information, views, and perspectives from both 
inside and outside of the government so that he 
could make the most informed decision that he 
could make.  The “surge” was going to be one of 
the most important decisions of President Bush’s 
presidency, would have a big impact on shaping 
his legacy, and was therefore a decision that only 
he could and should have made. 
 
 a.  The President is the “decider.”   
 
 The job of the National Security Advisor 
is to serve the President and enable Presidential 
decisions.   The National Security Advisor is not 
“the decider.”  Indeed, contrary to the general 
public perception, the National Security Council 
itself is not a decisionmaking body.  By statute, 
its role is only advisory, a source of information 
and advice to the President to help the President 
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make national security and foreign policy 
decisions. 
 
 b.  Make sure the national security 
organizational structure and the interagency 
process are meeting the President’s needs and 
evolve over time.   
 
 Congressional control over the operation 
of the national security system within the 
Executive Branch is limited precisely to allow 
each President to mold the system to his or her 
particular leadership and management style.  The 
system and structure are designed to be flexible.  
Each incoming President should establish the 
interagency organization and process – and the 
structure and procedures of the National Security 
Council staff – that fit the President’s policy 
priorities and operating style.  And these 
organizational structures, processes, and 
procedures should adapt over the course of the 
Presidency. 
 
 For example, the needs of a second term 
President are very different from those of the 
President in the first year or two in office.  By the 
second term, a President has met all the world 
leaders, has been through a number of crises, and 
has established a wide array of policies.  A second 
term President knows what they know, and 
knows what they think, about almost every issue 
of consequence.  The national security system, 
processes, and organization should adapt as a 
consequence. 
 
 c.  Bring issues and options to the 
President for decision – and don’t try to force a 
false consensus.   
 
 It is a great temptation for a National 
Security Advisor to try to force consensus on an 
issue and bring that consensus to the President.  
This may be appropriate for less important issues 
– if a true consensus can be achieved.  Even then, 
the National Security Advisor should run the 
issue and the consensus position by the President 
– for the President may disagree with the 
consensus, and the President, after all, is the 
“decider.”  But especially for issues of 
consequence, it is better to bring the issue and a 
fully fleshed out set of options to the President for 
decision. 
 
  When I became National 
Security Advisor, during my first meeting with 
the press reporters who covered national security 
issues in the White House, one of the reporters 
asked something along the following lines:  if 
Condi Rice, a major public figure with strong 
personal ties to the President, could not knock 
heads and force consensus among the 600-pound 
gorillas of Dick Cheney, Don Rumsfeld, and 
Colin Powell, how was I going to do it?  I 
responded that I was not going to try.  Because, I 
told them, I had a 1200-pound gorilla just down 
the hall called the President of the United States 
who loved to make decisions – and once the 
President had made a decision, these consummate 
professionals and accomplished public servants 
who work for him would salute and fall in line.  I 
think that is the right model for an effective 
national security decisionmaking process. 
 
  To facilitate that process, in the 
second year of the second term and with the 
President’s agreement, I instituted the Tuesday 
afternoon “tortilla chips and soda” meeting in the 
National Security Advisor’s office.  The 
attendees were limited to the Vice President, the 
White House Chief of Staff (whose schedule 
made his attendance admittedly difficult), the 
Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury (on 
many but not all occasions – which was a mistake 
– the Treasury Secretary should have always been 
there), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
the Director of National Intelligence, the Director 
of Central Intelligence, and my principal Deputy 
National Security Advisor.  That was all.  We 
served tortilla chips, warm cheese dip, and soft 
drinks and other non-alcoholic beverages of 
choice.  The meeting would usually go for a 
couple hours and if necessary would be continued 
over to Thursday afternoon, same time, same 
place. 
 
  The purpose of these meetings 
was to create a relaxed atmosphere of confidence 
in which the most challenging – and often the 
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most sensitive – policy and operational issues 
could be discussed candidly and openly without 
fear of leaks to the press.  Issues like what to do 
about Iran’s nuclear program, the Syrian nuclear 
reactor, and next steps in the war on terror were 
aired in this forum.  And it worked.  Strong 
disagreements were often expressed but without 
rancor and usually with great mutual respect. 
 
  At the end of the discussion of an 
issue, it was usually the Vice President who 
would say:  “Steve, this was a good discussion.  
Now how are we going to take this issue to the 
President?”  I would then go to the Chief of Staff 
(Andy Card at first, then Josh Bolten) and we 
would come up with the most appropriate way to 
bring the issue to the President.  If the issue was 
ready for decision, then that might be a formal 
National Security Council meeting with all the 
“tortilla chips and soda” meeting participants 
present along with other appropriate department 
and agency heads.  For a less formal setting, we 
might use the Oval Office.  But if we really 
wanted the President to be in a listening and 
discussion mode – not in the “decider” mode – 
then we might meet in the “Yellow Oval” in the 
residence perhaps on a Saturday morning or 
afternoon – again, with others present as 
appropriate.  But the “tortilla chips and soda” 
meetings were crucial in preparing the issue for 
the President, ensuring a full and frank 
discussion, and letting the President hear the full 
range of views directly from the President’s key 
national security and foreign policy advisors. 
 
 3.  Provide your policy advice to the 
President in confidence.   
 
 A third key element of the Scowcroft 
Model is that as National Security Advisor you 
never talk publicly about the advice you give to 
the President.  And you generally give that advice 
to the President in private.  For example, I would 
very rarely express my views on an issue at a 
formal National Security Council meeting.  I 
thought my job during such meetings was to sit 
down the table from President Bush so that I 
could better observe the dynamic around the 
table.  My responsibility was to make sure that the 
President was getting the information he needed, 
was hearing the views of all the various national 
security and foreign policy cabinet secretaries 
and agency heads, and understood what he was 
hearing.  If something was not clear in the 
discussion, my job was to ask the “stupid 
question” that would bring out for the President 
what might not be clear or understood.  After the 
meeting, when the President had returned to the 
Oval Office, or at some other more private 
occasion, I would offer my views – and usually in 
response to a “so what do you think” from the 
President. 
 
4.  Keep a low public profile and operate 
generally off stage.   
 
 This is the fourth key element of the 
Scowcroft Model.  The bane of too many 
Presidential administrations has been all too 
public competition and conflict between and 
among key national security and foreign policy 
principals.  Most often such conflict has occurred 
between the Secretary of State and the Secretary 
of Defense, but it has also arisen between the 
National Security Advisor and one or the other of 
those two cabinet secretaries.  Such public 
competition and conflict is not good for the 
President and it is not good for the country.  It 
creates an image of disarray that undermines 
public confidence in the soundness and 
effectiveness of the administration’s national 
security and foreign policy.  It can confuse the 
public in terms of who speaks for the 
administration on such issues. 
 
 A principal responsibility of the National 
Security Advisor is to run the interagency and 
 
 . . . the National Security Advisor needs to run a a disciplined National Security Council staff 
that does not leak – that does not seek to settle bureaucratic scores through the traditional 
press or social media . . . 
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decisionmaking process in a way that avoids such 
an outcome. 
First and foremost, this means not 
contributing personally to internal feuds or 
conflicts either in appearance or in fact.  It means 
not having too public a profile and avoiding 
actions that would undermine or usurp the role of 
the cabinet secretaries. 
Secondly, it means avoiding leaks.  In the 
first place, the National Security Advisor should 
never be a leaker – if he or she puts out something 
on background to the press (in person, by phone, 
by email, or by tweet), it should only be because 
the President has directed it -- and it should of 
course not involve classified information in any 
way. 
In the  third place, the National Security 
Advisor needs to run a a disciplined National 
Security Council staff that does not leak – that 
does not seek to settle bureaucratic scores 
through the traditional press or social media – that 
always approaches its interagency colleagues by 
giving them the benefit of the doubt and the 
presumption of good faith (even when it is not 
always deserved). 
And finally, the National Security 
Advisor needs to work with the other national 
security principals to discourage leaks from the 
rest of the government – whether by the national 
security principal directly or through their staff, 
or by staff members acting on their own.  This 
effort starts with the National Security Advisor 
running a fair and transparent decisionmaking 
process in which the national security principals 
and their department and agencies have an 
opportunity to participate fully and directly with 
the President. 
5. Accept responsibility.
This is the fifth element of the Scowcroft 
Model.  If you become the National Security 
Advisor, you are going to make mistakes.  The 
question is what you do then.  The best approach:  
go to the President, disclose and admit your 
mistake, accept the consequences, and resign if 
warranted by the facts or the best interests of the 
President.   The last 40 years in Washington -- 
Watergate and all the “gates” and scandals that 
followed – have taught us all one lesson:  it is 
rarely the mistake you make that gets you in 
trouble or causes lasting damage; it is the cover-
up, the natural human instinct to flee the scene, to 
deny, to lie, and to try not to get caught.  Don’t 
do it.  Fess up.  Accept responsibility.  And take 
the consequences. 
And sometimes take responsibility when 
the problem or fault is not your own. 
It is fascinating to be part of a group 
assembled around the President’s desk in the 
Oval Office when a serious problem is brought to 
the attention of the President.  As the bad news is 
being laid out for the President, you can see 
people gradually moving backward – moving 
away from the President’s desk and the problem 
that has just been place on it.  What the President 
needs at that moment, of course, is for someone 
to step forward and own the problem – even if not 
responsible for creating it – and assume 
responsibility for handling the matter, addressing 
the problem, and reporting back the the President 
if more needs to be done.  Be one of those people.  
That is what the President needs. 
Conclusion 
So, you have just been appointed 
National Security Advisor.  What do you do?  
Channel Brent Scowcroft.  When confronted with 
a problem, try asking: “What would Brent have 
done?”  Follow the Scowcroft Model.  It is the 
best and only place to start.  Thank your lucky 
stars that you have a chance to serve our country 
and its President in this very special role.  And get 
a lot of sleep.  You are going to need it.  
The views expressed in this report are those of the author, and do not 
necessarily reflect the positions of any of the institutions to which she is 
affiliated, the Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs, the Bush School of 
Government and Public Service, or Texas A&M University. 
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Stephen J. Hadley: 
Stephen Hadley is a principal of 
RiceHadleyGates LLC, an international strategic 
consulting firm founded with Condoleezza Rice, 
Robert Gates, and Anja Manuel.  
RiceHadleyGates assists senior executives of 
major corporations in overcoming the challenges 
to doing business successfully in major emerging 
markets like China, India, Brazil, Turkey, and 
Indonesia.   
Mr. Hadley is also Board Chairman of the United 
States Institute of Peace (USIP). He has co-
chaired a series of senior bipartisan working 
groups on topics such as Arab-Israeli peace, U.S. 
political strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
U.S./Turkey relations, and US policy on Iraq and
Egypt.
Mr. Hadley served for four years as the Assistant 
to the President for National Security Affairs 
from 2005 - 2009. In that capacity he was the 
principal White House foreign policy advisor to 
then President George W. Bush, directed the 
National Security Council staff, and ran the 
interagency national security policy development 
and execution process. From 2001 to 2005, Mr. 
Hadley was the Assistant to the President and 
Deputy National Security Advisor, serving under 
then National Security Advisor Condoleezza 
Rice. In addition to covering the full range of 
national security issues, Mr. Hadley had special 
responsibilities in several areas including a 
U.S./Russia political dialogue, the Israeli
disengagement from Gaza, and developing a
strategic relationship with India.
From 1993 to 2001, Mr. Hadley was both a 
partner in the Washington D.C. law firm of Shea 
and Gardner (now part of Goodwin Proctor) and 
a principal in The Scowcroft Group (a strategic 
consulting firm headed by former National 
Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft). In his law 
practice, Mr. Hadley was administrative partner 
of the firm. He represented a range of corporate 
clients in transactional and international matters - 
including export controls,  foreign investment in 
U.S. national security companies, and the 
national security responsibilities of U.S. 
information technology companies. In his 
consulting practice, Mr. Hadley represented U.S. 
corporate clients investing and doing business 
overseas. 
From 1989 to 1993, Mr. Hadley served as the 
assistant secretary of defense for international 
security policy under then Secretary of Defense 
Dick Cheney. Mr. Hadley represented the 
Defense Department on arms control and defense 
matters, including negotiations with the Soviet 
Union and then Russia, security issues involving 
NATO and Western Europe, and export and 
technology control matters.  Prior to this position, 
Mr. Hadley alternated between government 
service and law practice with Shea & Gardner. He 
was counsel to the Tower Commission in 1987, 
as it investigated U.S. arms sales to Iran, and 
served on the National Security Council staff 
under President Ford from 1974 to 1977. 
During his professional career, Mr. Hadley has 
served on a number of corporate and advisory 
boards. He is currently the Chair of RAND’s 
Center for Middle East Public Policy Advisory 
Board, chair of the Human Freedom Advisory 
Council of the George W. Bush Institute, a 
member of Yale University’s Kissinger Papers 
Advisory Board, a member of the Executive 
Committee and Board of Directors of the Atlantic 
Council, a member of the Board of Managers of 
the John Hopkins University’s Applied Physics 
Laboratory, and a member of the State 
Department’s Foreign Affairs Policy Board. 
Other positions have included past service as a 
member of the Department of Defense Policy 
Board, member of the National 
Security Advisory Panel to the Director of 
Central Intelligence, and co-chair with former 
Secretary of Defense William Perry of the 2010 
Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel.  
Mr. Hadley graduated magna cum laude and Phi 
Beta Kappa from Cornell University in 1969. In 
1972, he received his J.D. degree from Yale Law 
School, where he was Note and Comment Editor 
of the Yale Law Journal. From 1972 to 1975 he 
served as an officer in the U.S. Navy. 
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The Bush School of Government and Public Service 
Ambassador Ryan Crocker, Dean and Executive Professor 
Founded in 1997, the Bush School of Government and Public Service has become one of the leading public 
and international affairs graduate schools in the nation. One of ten schools and colleges at Texas A&M 
University, a tier-one research university, the School offers master’s level education for students aspiring 
to careers in public service.  
The School is ranked in the top 12 percent of graduate public affairs schools in the nation, according to 
rankings published in U.S. News & World Report. The School now ranks thirty-third among both public 
and private public affairs graduate programs and twenty-first among public universities.  
The School’s philosophy is based on the belief of its founder, George H.W. Bush, that public service is a 
noble calling—a belief that continues to shape all aspects of the curriculum, research, and student 
experience. In addition to the Master of Public Service and Administration degree and the Master of 
International Affairs degree, the School has an expanding online and extended education program that 
includes Certificates in Advanced International Affairs, Homeland Security, and Nonprofit Management. 
Located in College Station, Texas, the School’s programs are housed in the Robert H. and Judy Ley Allen 
Building, which is part of the George Bush Presidential Library Center on the West Campus of Texas A&M. 
This location affords students access to the archival holdings of the George Bush Presidential Library and 
Museum, invitation to numerous events hosted by the George Bush Foundation at the Annenberg 
Presidential Conference Center, and inclusion in the many activities of the Texas A&M community. 
The Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs 
Andrew S. Natsios, Director and Executive Professor 
The Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs (SIIA) is a research institute housed in the Bush 
School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. The Institute is named in 
honor of Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, USAF (Ret.), whose long and distinguished career in public 
service included serving as National Security Advisor for Presidents Gerald Ford and George H.W. 
Bush. The Institute's core mission is to foster and disseminate policy-oriented research on 
international affairs by supporting faculty and student research, hosting international speakers and 
major scholarly conferences, and providing grants to outside researchers to use the holdings of the 
Bush Library.  
"We live in an era of tremendous global change. Policy makers will confront unfamiliar 
challenges, new opportunities, and difficult choices in the years ahead. I look forward to the 
Scowcroft Institute supporting policy-relevant research that will contribute to our understanding 
of these changes, illuminating their implications for our national interest, and fostering lively 
exchanges about how the United States can help shape a world that best serves our interests and 
reflects our values."  
  — Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, USAF (Ret.) 
